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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
informed and when made aware that certain of their practices are ob-
jectionable, they will voluntarily abandon them.4 7
When prevention and persuasion have failed, more stringent action
should be undertaken. The bar can urge the prosecution of laymen en-
gaged in the unauthorized practice of law under criminal statutes, where
they exist 4 8 Whether such a statute exists or not, the bar has the right
to bring an injunction action against such layman.49 If the offender is a
duly licensed attorney there are available both the statutory sanctions50
and the traditional powers of the courts to control the conduct of its offi-
cers. 5' In any event, action is the answer.
DONALD W FARLEY
The Portsmouth Strike: Ohio's Hot Potato
PREFACE
One of the "hottest potatoes" ever to confront Ohio's lawmakers was
recently laid in the lap of Ohio's General Assembly.' On November 26,
1956, Governor Frank J. Lausche called an extraordinary session of the
legislature in an attempt to bring to a dose the widely publicized tele-
phone strike at Portsmouth, Oho.2  Nation-wide attention was focused
upon the Ohio River community. The strike was one of the longest and
most devastating labor disputes in Ohio's industrial history. Issues of
vital significance were raised.
This article will recount the Portsmouth story and analyze the strike
-in retrospect. The success of other states in their handling of similar
"hot potatoes" will be reviewed in light of recent United States Supreme
Court decisions. The article will be limited to a discussion of work stop-
pages in privately owned public utilities. Labor disputes in publicly
owned utilities, railroads and the atomic energy industry are not within
the scope of this note.3
,1 Unauthorized Practice Commitee Presents, 9 TExAs B. J. 429 (1946); Exhibit A,
10 OHIO BAR 535 (1938)
SOHIo REV. CODE § 4705.07
" Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass n, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577
(1931); State Bar v. Retail Credit Ass'n, 170 Okla. 246, 37 P 2d 954 (1934)
r
0 OHIO REv. CODE §§ 2901.39, 2917.43 and 4705.01-06.
'Judd v. City Trust and Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E. 2d 288 (1937);
Norwalk and Portsmouth Bar Ass n v. Drewery, 161 Va. 833, 172 S.E. 282 (1934).
For a digest of the reported Ohio cases concerned with the unauthorized practice of
law see 27 OHIO BAR 1048 (1954) For a statement of principles of the Unau-
thorized Practice Committee of the American Bar Ass'n see, Unauthorized Practice
Committee Presents, 9 TEXAS B. J. 426 (1946)
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THE PORTSMOUTH STORY
Prior to 1955, telephone service in Portsmouth and other communities
in an area encompassing 24 southern Ohio counties was provided by the
Ohio Consolidated Telephone Co. The Communication Workers of
America represented the operators, linemen and maintenance men in
,bargaining with Ohio Consolidated. Through the years, labor relations
had been most harmonious. In 1955, the General Telephone Co., a bil-
lion dollar corporation doing business in 31 states, and second in size
only to the Bell system, acquired controlling interest in Ohio Consolidated.
The old collective bargaining agreement expired July 15, 1956. Con-
tract negotiations reached a deadlock over such key issues as the union
shop,4 union membership of supervisory employees, and a "no strike"
clause. The Communication Union had union shop provisions in sev-
eral of its agreements with General Telephone in other states. It insisted
that it could not give up conditions that it had gained over years of peace-
ful relationship with Ohio Consolidated.5 It was evident that the com-
munity of Portsmouth was being made the testing ground for General
Telephone's coming contract battles with the union -in other states.
The 228 day strike paralyzed Portsmouth. Violence, cable slashings,
mob riots and vandalism plagued the community. Company officials
angrily charged that law enforcement was a shambles and refused to sup-
ply emergency phone service without adequate police protection. The
139 GONGWER NEWs SERvicB, No. 1 (Nov. 29, 1956).
'The special session called by Governor Lausche was, as he remarked, his "swan
song" as governor of Ohio. At the expiration of his term in January, 1957, he
assumed his new duties in Washington as United States Senator from Ohio.
8Railroad labor disputes are covered by the Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577
(1926), 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et. seq. (Supp. 1956). For an excellent discussion of
collective bargaining problems in the atomic energy field see Newman, The Atomwc
Energy Industry: An Expertment %n Hybrdizatton, 60 YALE LJ. 1263, 1364
(1951).
'The union had worked under a union shop agreement with Ohio Consolidated for
over 14 years. Under such proviso, employers were permitted to hire workers on
the open market but all new employees were required to join the union within a
specified period and had to continue their membership in good standing through-
out the life of the agreement. Failure to do so automatically resulted in discharge
by the employer.
In the Portsmouth negotiations, General Telephone insisted on a maintenance
of membership clause rather than a union shop, whereby membership in the union
would not be required of new employees. They could join or not, as they preferred.
Once they did join however, they were obligated to maintain their union membership
in good standing for the life of the collective bargaining agreement as a condition
of employment. Matthews, LABOR RELATIONS AND TiE LAw, 447-448 (1953).
'It is almost axiomatic that a union will never give up a condition once won and
that there will be a strike until the union is broken or until it wins retention of that
condition.
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Portsmouth area was completely devoid of telephone service from Octo-
ber 15th to December 16, 1956. Portsmouth's City Council declared
that a state of emergency existed. The Portsmouth Medical Society as-
serted that the health of the entire community was in jeopardy. Emer-
gency police, fire and hospital services were rendered virtually inoperative.
During the blackout, the union repeated its former offer to provide
emergency service -if the company would discharge the "strikebreakers"
who allegedly had been hired to man the exchanges. The company re-
fused and charged the union with instigating mob violence and destroy-
ing company property. The union repeatedly disclaimed any knowledge
of the continued vandalism, asserting that such action was against union
principles.6
The strike settled down to a sheer test of economic strength and hold-
mg power. Both parties adamantly held their initial ground. Repeated
union offers to submit to arbitration were refused. Governor Lausche
personally intervened at the early stages, but was unable to induce the
disputants to make any concessions. The Federal Mediation and Con-
ciliation Service7 reported absolutely no progress in its continued efforts
to effect an agreement. The State Highway Patrol was helpless to quell
any rioting since its statutory authority extended only to any misconduct
obstructing the free use of the state's highways.8 Governor Lausche
alerted the Ohio National Guard to be prepared to move into Portsmouth,
but the people of Portsmouth strongly objected to such a measure.' In
addition, the Ohio Industrial Commission'0 and the Public Utilities Com-
mission" were without jurisdiction to cope with the matter.
'A union is not responsible per se for the actions of its members, since member-
ship alone is not sufficient to show agency. Matter of Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co., 87
N.L.R.B. 54 (1949) The illegal conduct must be traced to an officer or some
person who is acting within the scope of his general authority. Matter of Gammino
Constr. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 52, 29 L.R.R.M. 1103 (1951) For a complete analysis
see Union Responsibility for Acts of Officers and Members, 63 HARVARm L.R. 1035
(1950).
761 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. 5 173 (Supp. 1956)
8 OHio REV. CODE § 5503.02.
'Public opimon in industrial Portsmouth was strongly pro-union. The collective
bargaining agreements of other unions in town provided for a union shop. One
Portsmouth public official remarked that "General Telephone was like a bull in a
china shop, coming into Portsmouth and disturbing labor relations that had been
good for 14 years."
A city-wide sympathy strike was threatened if the National Guard were called
in. The Portsmouth Voluntary Citizens Committee recommended that the Guard
be called in "only as a matter of last resort."
0 The Ohio Industrial Commission enforces and administers all laws relating to the
health, welfare and working conditions of employees engaged in industrial activity
within the State. It has no authority to mediate or conciliate labor disputes. OHIO
REV. CODE § 4101.03. The Commission, however, rendered an advisory opinion in
[September
NOTES
A crisis had arisen. To avert disaster, Governor Lausche called an
extraordinary session of -the General Assembly. He asked that legislation
-be passed authorizing the State of Ohio to seize and operate a public
utility when the Governor felt that an impasse in collective bargaining
had been reached which resulted in a deprivation of utility services and
had created an emergency in the area required to be served.12 The bill
was referred to committee and the hearings that followed were stormy.
Union and General Telephone officials, in a rare display of unanimity,
vehemently condemned the proposal, stating that it was unworkable and
unconstitutional.1
3
The committee recommended against passage1 4 and the bill was de-
.feated. The special session ended but the strike continued in paralyzed
Portsmouth. Ohio's legislators had bobbled the "hot potato," then tossed
it back to the people of Portsmouth who were already scalded with third
degree burns.
the Portsmouth Strike, wherein it held that the union's stand for preservation of the
union shop clause was valid and recommended that it be continued In the new
agreement. The Industrial Commission also suggested that the issue of the scope of
the bargaining unit be submitted to the National Labor Relations Board and that
other disputed items be submitted to arbitration. The union offered to comply with
the advisory opinion, the company rejected it.
'The Public Utilities Commission has the power to regulate public utilities and
railroads in Ohio, but no provision is made for the handling of labor disputes in a
utility. OHio REv. CODE § 4905.04. However, in early November 1956, the irate
citizens of Portsmouth presented a petition, signed by 20,000 Portsmouth area
residents, to the Commission requesting that it revoke General Telephone's franchise
and authorize another telephone company to furnish service to the community. The
Commission ordered General Telephone to show cause why emergency service should
not be furnished. The company filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Ohio
Supreme Court, contending that the Commission was without jurisdiction in the
matter. The company obtained a temporary restraining order against the Com-
mission, prohibiting it from taking any further action until a preliminary hearing
could be held on the petition of the company. 4 Ohio L. Rep. 35 (Nov. 26, 1956)
-H.B. 949, 101st Ohio Gen. Assembly, 3d Sp. Sess., 1956.
"The proposed seizure bill was patterned after a Virginia Statute, VA. CODE ANN.
§5 56-510 et seq. (1956 Supp.). Virginia had found its seizure statute most suc-
cessful in coping with utility stoppages.
" The House Judiciary Committee, upon conclusion of the hearings, found that much
of the violence could have been prevented by adequate law enforcement in the
Portsmouth area. The committee concluded that the bill should not be passed be-
cause (1) It was contrary to Ohio's constitution in that it provided for seizure of pri-
vate property without just compensation prior to the taking; (2) It should be in-
effective since it attempted to cover a field of legislation already found by the
United States Supreme Court to have been pre-empted by the federal government
under the National Labor Relations Act; (3) It required revision, being unworkable,
and such could not be accomplished at that special session; (4) It would weaken
collective bargaining to the detriment of labor relations in public utilities; and (5)
The public interest would not be served by legislation conceived in the heat of the
dispute and passed without adequate study.
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In early January, 1957, the company declared that it had made its
last offer, and if the workers refused to return to their jobs, replacements
would 'be hired. The union charged the company with refusal to bargain
in good faith and bitterly criticized it for attempting to break the morale
of the strikers. Later, in January, General Telephone -brought unfair labor
practice charges 'before the National Labor Relations Board, claiming that
union members were being coerced into continuing the strike. At the
Board hearing, the entire 200 members of the Portsmouth local denied
such charges. On the contrary, the hearing boomeranged, for three men
testified under oath that they had 'been hired by a General Telephone
official to "get four union leaders out of the picture."' 5
In February, newly elected Ohio Governor C. William ONeill, during
his first day in office, drew up the necessary papers to send the National
Guard into Portsmouth if any further violence occurred. He informed
the disputants that they must settle the strike. Finally, after a 25 hour
bargaining session, an agreement was reached and the 228 day strike
ended. The new agreement substituted a maintenance of membership
clause for the union shop and the union agreed not to strike over any
grievance that could 'be submitted to arbitration. The question of union
membership of supervisory employees was submitted to the National
Labor Relations Board. Neither side would say what 'broke the logjam
which had continued after the company made its last offer.'
6
'Company officials declared that such charges were trumped up and absurd and
asserted that the company would not submit to such a libelous attack and would take
appropriate action. The recent report of the trial examiner's opinion however, sub-
stantated the union's position. The examiner found that company officials and
outsiders hired to "break the strike" had deliberately provoked union members in
the picket lines; had often initiated the violence; and had on several occasions,
pointed loaded revolvers at the union men while threatening and taunting them. He
found that violence was first perpetrated by the company itself, when a company
official, in his automobile, deliberately and wilfully ran down and seriously injured
a union member. N.L.R.B. Rep., (9th Region C.B. 327-328, (April 11, 1957)
In mid-July, 1957, the N.L.R.B. General Counsel took exception to the trial
examiner's findings.
"
8The cost of the strike was estimated at two million dollars. The umon said that
its 600 strikers lost about $950,000 in wages. The company estimated its property
damages to be $400,000. Later, on July 3, 1957, the Communication Union was
sued by the company for three million dollars. The company alleged that its prop-
erty damages exceeded $500,000.00; that its employees were subjected to vile and
obscene abuse of character; that in furtherance of the strike, an unlawful combina-
tion and conspiracy was wrongfully, maliciously and unjustifiably entered into by the
union and its members; and that the union attempted to coerce and force the com-
pany to agree to union demands.
The union president remarked that the suit was "apparently a smokescreen to
cover up the company s own activities." He stated that "it was really the company
that made all the demands, all we wanted to keep was what we had." Cleveland
Plain Dealer, July 4, 1957, p. 6.
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PORTSMOUm IN RmOSPECT
The Portsmouth strike caught Ohio with its legislative guard down.
There were no Ohio statutes dealing with such an emergency. Ground
rules were made and broken as the strike wore on. It proved to be an
economic "pier six brawl" which drew national headlines, aroused the
people of Ohio, alienated the participants, and left Portsmouth a stunned,
resentful community. Public passions were fanned by the newspapers.
The union claimed that many distortions and half-truths were printed.
Although the Communication Union had enjoyed excellent labor rela-
tions with Ohio Consolidated for over 14 years,'7 one Ohio newspaper
indignantly described the union as:
The labor goons who have forfeited all claims to respectability.
Once again the Communication Union has set itself above the law, and
has fallen back on violence and destruction of property. This follows a
pattern set by the union.
As a result of such irresponsible reporting, the general public is often
prone to think of the strike only as a dangerous and unwarranted evil.
Any labor dispute, however inconsequential, is often fair game for a
front page article with an indignant headline. Ignored is the fact that
in most instances, collective bargaining is a peaceful process.
The right to strike is basic to all of labor's rights. Without it, labor
would lose its bargaining power. Collective bargaining would fail if a
strike was not permitted" to run its natural course and eventually bring
the parties to agreement.
If labor were to abuse its federally guaranteed right to strike,' 9 un-
,told harm would result to -the disputants, the community, and labor's cause
in general. Union violence and foul play are not protected by federal
law. A state has a duty to protect -its citizens from such unlawful acts.
The right to strike is not without restrictions. Justice Brandeis, long a
champion of the cause of labor, once stated:
Because I have come to the conclusion that both the Common Law of
a state and a statute of the United States declare the right of industrial
combatants to push their struggle to the limits of justification of self
interest, I do not wish to be understood as attaching any constitutional or
moral sanction to that right. All rights are derived from the purposes of
The action was brought in the Cincinnati Common Pleas Court. There has been
no disposition of the case as of the date of writing.
I This fact was attested to by Portsmouth officials and the Ohio Industrial Commis-
sion.
'Cleveland Plain Dealer editorial, October 18, 1956, p. 16. For an interesting
analysis of newspaper reporting of labor disputes see: Eaton, A Capitalist Looks at
Labor, 14 UNv. oF Cm. L.R. 332, 334 (1947).
"61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 163 (Supp. 1956).
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the society in which they exist; above all rights rises the duty to com-
munity. 20
Serious questions arise when the right to strike is considered in light
of duties and obligations owed the community by a public utility. Public
utilities are bound to serve all who offer to patronize them, without dis-
crimination, at reasonable rates.2 ' Almost all states have public utility
commissions which regulate the rates and services of those utilities doing
business within their borders. Monopoly and the resulting elimination
of wasteful competition in the utility field are fostered. As a result, a
utility is placed in a highly important relation with the public. It may
not withdraw its services without state authorization 2  It is evident that
a public utility, since its continued operation is so essential to secure the
health, welfare and safety of the public, would be subject to regulations
whose constitutionality might be questionable if applied to purely private
enterprises.
However, the right to strike is guaranteed by federal law. Although
the Federal Act applies only to businesses engaged in interstate commerce,
it has been held that publit utilities come within its purview, even though
they might operate solely within the 'borders of the state.23  In protect-
ing the right to strike in a public utility, the question arises whether
Congress intended to preclude the states from exercising their inherent
police powers to protect their citizens when a local emergency arises from
a utility stoppage. This issue has often been brought before the courts.
A brief outline of the history of federal versus state control over utility
activities will be presented and the untenable position in which the states
have been placed by recent Supreme Court decisions will be discussed.
FEDERAl PRE-EMPTION: STATE PERDITION?
In the area of labor regulation, the constitutional doctrine of federal
supremacy 24 has proven to be a two-edged sword. While regulating at
the national level, it has often invalidated controls at the state leveL2 5
Early United States Supreme Court cases consistently held that in the
national field, federal control was properly exclusive, but when the mat-
ter was local, the state had concurrent power to legislate in the absence of
federal action 2 Prior to the advent of the so-called "new deal" Supreme
" Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 448 (1921)
'Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
2' Transit Comm n v. United States, 284 U.S. 360 (1932).
2 Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197 (1938); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877)
11 U.S. CoNST. art. VI. cl. 2.
IMATTHEW$, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAw 835 (1953).
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Cooley v. Bd. of Port Wardens, 12 How-
ard 299 (1851)
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Court in the 1930's, the prevailing philosophy of constitutional interpre-
tation left control over industrial relations to the states2 7
Following President Franklin D. Roosevelt's epic struggles with the
"nine old men," the tide turned. In Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones and
Laughlin,28 the Supreme Court held that the Wagner Act29 was constitu-
tional and confirmed the newly asserted power of the national govern-
ment in regulating labor relations.30 Even though the right of labor to
bargain collectively and engage in concerted economic activities was now
federally protected, the Supreme Court in the 1940's held that the states
could still restrain unlawful union activities which endangered the wel-
fare of their citizens.3 '
In the public utility field, the states had long exerted control over
utilities rendering services within their borders. Acting under their po-
lice power, they reasoned that state controls over concerted activities were
applicable to all 'businesses, whether interstate or intra-state, since Con-
gress had not enacted legislation expressly excluding such state action.
One of the strongest measures taken by the states in controlling labor
relations in public utilities was the passage of compulsory arbitration
statutes.32  In 1920, Kansas enacted such legislation. A court of indus-
trial relations was given jurisdiction to prohibit strikes and lockouts in
certain industries, including public utilities.33 The Supreme Court im-
mediately struck down certain provisions of the Kansas Act as violative
of the due process clause of the 14th amendment. 34 The court, however,
never addressed itself to the constitutionality of compulsory arbitration
'West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by, United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S.
100 (1941); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
'National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-166
(Supp. 1956).
' See also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
"Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); Carpenters and
Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
" Any system of compulsory arbitration presupposes the existence of a governmental
mandate requiring the parties to submit their differences to final settlement by some
third party. Strikes and lockouts are forbidden. The third parry s decision is en-
forceable by legal sanctions. See: Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes in
Public Utiltities: A Review of Recent Statutes, 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 221 (1950)
",KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-604 et seq. (1949).
slIn Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923),
the Supreme Court held the Kansas Act unconstitutional as far as it fixed compulsory
wages in the meat-packing industry, since such activity was not clothed with a
public interest. In Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924), the court held as in-
valid similar provisions applying to coal mines.
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statutes in general. The Kansas statute, though not dead, had failed.
Compulsory arbitration lay dormant for over 20 years.
Following World War II, a wave of strikes swept the country. Public
resentment against such concerted work stoppages was evident. Several
local emergencies had resulted from public utility strikes. The Federal
Act had a provision concerning national emergencies resulting from work
stoppages,3' but since a utility strike only affected a particular locality,
it did not fall within such Act. Consequently a number of states sought
to fill -the gap by enacting legislation prohibiting strikes in public utili-
ties.a6 Under such enactments, arbitration, almost always compulsory,
was substituted for the prohibited right to strike.
Labor and management joined in denouncing compulsory arbitraton,
asserting that it undermined the very foundations of free collective bar-
gaining. Labor declared that compulsory arbitration eradicated the right
to strike and to engage in other lawful forms of concerted labor activities.
Management was equally adamant. It contended that compulsory arbitra-
tion was a long step in the destruction of private initiative in our free en-
terprise system.
37
The compulsory arbitration battle raged on. Advocates pointed to
congressional silence as indicative that the federal lawmakers had intended
to cede jurisdiction over utility emergencies to the states. However the
Taft-Hartley Act,3 8 like its predecessor, the Wagner Act,a9 fostered free
collective bargaining. Senator Taft himself, during a Senate debate prior
to the passage of his bill, stated, concerning the question of whether com-
pulsory arbitration should be provided in public utilities disputes:
Basically I believe that the solution of our labor problems must
rest on a free economy and on free collective bargaining. The bill is cer-
tainly based on that presumption. That means that we recognize freedom
to strike when the question involved is the improvement of wages, hours and
working conditions We have considered the question of whether the
'Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 141
(Supp. 1956)
"FLA. STAT. § 453.01 et seq. (1955); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2401 et seq. (1956);
MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 150 (1956); McH. STAT. ANN. § 17.454 (1952); MINN.
STAT. § 179.07 (1955); Mo. REV. STAT. § 295.180 (1956); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-816 (1956); N.J. REv. STAT. § 34: 13 B-16 (Supp. 1956); PA. STAT. tit. 43
§ 213.1 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-509 et seq. (Supp. 1956); Wis. STAT.
5 5111.50 etseq. (1949).
' For a thorough discussion of the comments and criticisms of compulsory arbitration
see: Complsory Arbitraton, NATIONAL AssocIATioN OF MANUFACTuRER'S
BULLETIN (August, 1951)
1 Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.
(Supp. 1956).
'National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-166
(Supp. 1956).
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right to strike can be modified. We do not feel that we should put into
law, as part of the collective bargaining machinery, an ultimate resort to
compulsory arbitration if we impose compulsory arbitration, or if we
give government the power to fix wages I do not see how in the end we
can escape a collective economy.'0
DECLINE AND FALL OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
The compulsory arbitration statutes withstood early attacks upon their
constitutionality.41 The New Jersey Supreme Court stated, in discussing
a utility strike:
Where, by reason of a strike, work stoppage or lockout, the flow of
services of one of these essentials of community life is halted or impaired,
the state not only has the right but a pressing duty to step in and prevent
the continuance of such stoppage or impairment and to take appropriate
measures to restore them. '
The court stressed the indispensable nature of utility services, especially
telephone service, without which fire and police protection would be ren-
dered relatively ineffective.
The death knell for compulsory arbitration was first tolled in the case
of Automobile Workers v. O'Brien,43 where the United States Supreme
Court held that Michigan's Labor Mediation Law44 conflicted with federal
law and hence was invalid. Michigan's law prohibited strikes in any in-
dustry unless state-prescribed procedure for mediation was followed and
unless a majority of employees in a state-defined bargaitung unit author-
ized the strike in a state-conducted election. The court held that Con-
gress had completely occupied the field of regulation of peaceful strikes
and precluded state regulation.
The coup de grace followed in the case of Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wis-
consm Employment Relations Bd.45 The Supreme Court held that a Wis-
consin statute4 6 which specifically prohibited public utility strikes and re-
quired the parties to submit to compulsory arbitration was in conflict with
the federal law. The contention was made that Congress had only en-
acted legislation covering national emergencies but was silent as to local
emergencies, thus leaving that area to state regulation. In reply, the court
stressed that Wisconsin's Act was not confined to local emergencies, hav-
4S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14, 28 (1947)
"State v. Traffic Telephone Workers, 142 NJ. Eq. 785, 61 A.2d 570 (1948), re-
versed on other grounds, 2 NJ. 335, 66 A.2d 616 (1949); Int'l Union v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 250 Wis. 550, 27 N.W 2d 875 (1947).
2State v. Telephone Workers Federation, 2 NJ. 335,345, 66 A.2d 616, 621 (1949)
'3339 U.S. 454 (1950).
mIcHL COMP. LAws §§ 423.1 et seq. (1948).
'5340 U.S. 383 (1951).
41WIs. STAT. § 111.50 et seq. (1949).
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ing been applied to labor disputes where no emergency existed. The
court summarily disposed of the local emergency matter, citing the
O'Brien case,47 and concluded that Congress had excluded the field of
peaceful strikes from state jurisdiction.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Frankfurter stated that Congress should
have been explicit if it desired to remove such matters of intimate local
concern from the orbit of state regulation. He declared that the princi-
ple of "hands off collective bargaining" was no more absolute than the
right to strike, and cited the national emergency provisions of the Taft-
Hardey Act48 as an affirmative indication that the force of collective bar-
gaining may be limited in emergency situations. He stated:
But the careful consideration given to the problems of meeting nation-
wide emergencies and the failure to provide for emergencies other than
those affecting the nation as a whole do not imply paralysis of State police
power. Rather, they imply that the States retain the power to protect the
public interest in emergencies economically and practically confined within
the state. It is not reasonable to impute to Congress the desire to leave
States helpless in meeting local situations when Congress restricted na-
tional intervention to national emergencies!'
Justice Frankfurter concluded that the wisdom of compulsory arbitration
was not for the court to decide, but suggested that perhaps seizure, martial
law, or other affirmative state action might better assure continuance of
utility services and still preserve the concept of free collective bargaining.
As a result of the Amalgamated decision, several of the compulsory
arbitration statutes were immediately overturned. 50 Serious doubt as to
the validity of the remaining legislation was raised, since all public util-
tities, interstate or solely intra-state, were affected by the result. In so
discarding the concept of state police power over local matters and ex-
tending federal regulation over all industries affecting interstate com-
merce, the Supreme Court may have controverted the intention of Con-
gress. Public protection during emergency disputes would fail at the
47339 U.S. 454 (1950)
' tabor-Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 176
(Supp. 1956)
"Amalgamated Ass n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 406
(1951)
'In Henderson v. Lee, 65 So.2d 22 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1953), the court held that the
National Labor Relations Act had pre-empted the field of regulation of peaceful
strikes in industries affecting interstate commerce, including public utilities and
Florida s statute (FLA. STAT. § 453.04), limiting the right by a substitution of com-
pulsory arbitration was invalid. A similar Indiana statute (IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-
2406), was declared invalid in Marshall v. Schrscker, C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 66, 372
(Ind. C. C. 1951). Likewise Missouri's statute (Mo. REV. STAT. § 295.180), was
declared invalid by an opinion of the Attorney General of that state. See C.C.H.
L. REP. 5 49, 142.
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local level, leaving the states virtually helpless. The Amalgamated result
created a no-man's land immune from any regulation whatsoever.
Congressional attempts were made, following the Amalgamated deci-
sion, to amend the Taft-Hartley Act and return jurisdiction over, such
local matters to the states.51 All such attempts failed, however, despite
the intervention of President Eisenhower, who focused the national spot-
light on the problem in 1954, when he stated, in a message to Congress:
The act should make clear that the several States and Territories,
when confronted with emergencies endangering the health or safety of their
citizens, are not, through any conflict with the Federal law, actual, or
implied, deprived of the right to deal with such emergencies. The need
for clarification of jurisdiction between the Federal and State and Tern-
torial government in the labor-management field has lately been empha-
sized by the broad implications of the most recent decision of the Supreme
Court dealing with this subject *
Although the Amalgamated decision has virtually hamstrung the tra-
ditional state police powers, it appears that the states may still resort to
various alternatives to cope with a local crisis. The Court might have
averted the harsh effect of its holding by stating that in times of emer-
gency, the state statute would be applicable. The court pointed out that
the Wisconsin statute was not confined to emergency situations, conse-
quently a statute applicable only after a local emergency had arisen might
be upheld. However it is believed that such a statute should exclude any
provisions for compulsory arbitration, which emasculates the federally
protected right to strike.
The court in the Amalgamated case, although it asserted that the fed-
eral government had pre-empted the area of public utility labor disputes,
took paros to point out that the Wisconsin act was inconsistent with fed-
eral law. Recently, the Supreme Court held that the states may only regu-
late labor disputes if the National Labor Relations Board has ceded them
jurisdiction and if their legislation complies with federal laws. 53 Conse-
quently if a state were to enact legislation, similar to the national emer-
gency provisions of the federal act, which spelled out that when a dearly
defined emergency resulting from a public utility stoppage had already
aS. 2650, 83d Cong. 2d. Sess. (1954); S. 1535, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. (1951)
' President Eisenhower s message referred to the recent case of Garner v. Teamsters,
Chauffeurs and Helpers, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), where the Supreme Court barred
state action restraining picketing which falls within the province of the National
Labor Relations Board, even though such picketing violated state laws.
'Amalagamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 77 Sup. Ct. 609 (1957).
The Fatriawn Case involved an Ohio labor dispute. The result indicates that Ohio
has no existing agencies which comply with Federal requirements. Consequently
the N.L.R.B. may not cede it its jurisdiction, and Ohio would be unable to take any
steps to control a non-violent labor dispute, affecting in any way, interstate com-
merce.
19571
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
artsen, it could take steps to prevent disaster, it is believed that such legis-
lation would be upheld. If the Supreme Court were to overturn such an
emergency measure it would, in effect, be telling the states that they have
no right to take any action to protect the lives of their citizens during a
crisis.
An alternative to compulsory arbitration was presented to Ohio's law-
makers when they met to decide the feasibility of Governor Lausche's re-
quest for power to seize and operate strike-bound utilities until the labor
dispute had been settled. The Portsmouth area was badly in need of help.
The strike had crippled the community. Some legislative action was ob-
viously necessary.
OHio JUcGus THE HOT POTATO
The Ohio legislature felt that the seizure bill was too hasty a measure.
However, haste is sometimes necessary in tunes of peril. It is conceded
that hastily drawn legislation often results from the stresses of an emer-
gency situation but such enactments should at least provoke further ef-
forts to meet the crisis.
Seizure5 4 was not offered as a panacea. It is often an intricate process,
and many weighty issues arise when the state seizes and operates a util-
ity.55 But it had been tried and proven successful in Virginia.5 It was
that state's answer to the unreasonable Amalgamated decision. Seizure is
not an adjunct of collective bargaining, nor a method of assisting or
avoiding a breakdown in collective bargaining. It does nor directly inter-
fere with the right to strike. It is purely a crisis measure.
In piously paying homage to the doctrine of pre-emption, Ohio's law-
makers offered little hope to the people of Portsmouth, or to future Ports-
mouths which could just as easily suffer similar experiences. 57  The spe-
" "The term 'seizure' in the field of labor-management disputes, refers to the taking
of possession, by the government, of a business which has ceased or is likely to cease
its operation by reason of a threatened or actual work stoppage, for the purpose of
securing its continued operation during the period of underlying controversy. It is
regarded as a step short of government ownership taken in a free enterprise society
in cases of extraordinary emergency. Seizure implies that the particular emergency
is expected to be temporary in nature and that upon adjustment of the underlying
controversy, the business activity will be returned to its owner." - Remarks of Dr.
Ludwig Teller before a conference on Training of Law Students in Labor Relations,
University of Michigan Law School, Vol. III of Committee Reports, p. 779 (1947)
' For an excellent discussion of the constitutional and procedural questions involved
when a state seizes a public utility see: Teller, Government Seizure in Labor Dis-
putes, 60 HARvARD L.R. 1017 (1947)
539 GONGWER NEws SERViCE, No. 2 (Nov. 30, 1956).
'On May 1, 1957, 2,600 members of the Utility Workers Union, Local 270, went
on strike against the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. The strike, affecting over
550,000 consumers in several northeastern Ohio counties, lasted seven days. Com-
pany personnel provided maintenance service. Although no serious altercations
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cial session left unanswered the burning question of what the State of
Ohio was to do when a lawful, Taft-Hartley protected strike resulted in a
public utility work stoppage. The special session found the "potato!' too
hot to handle.
During the following session of Ohio's General Assembly, two bills
dealing with public utility labor disputes were submitted. One58 author-
ized the governor to order the state highway patrol into an area where a
"disaster or an emergency existed or where any public utility service was
suspended" to enforce all state laws and to preserve the public peace. The
bill was offered as an answer to the break-down of law enforcement dur-
ing a strike, one of the underlying causes of the Portsmouth emergency. 9
The other bill was submitted by Representative Robert A. Taft, Jr.,
whose late father co-authored the Taft-Hartley Act. It attempted to meet
the real issues, unanswered by the emergency session. 9 The bill author-
ized the governor to appoint an inquiry board to investigate a public util-
ity labor dispute and report back to him within 14 days. After receiving
the report, the governor could ask the state's attorney general to petition
the courts for an injunction against a utility strike, lockout or slowdown.
Such injunction, if granted, would last for 60 days. The bill, in effect, ap-
plied the national emergency provisions of the federal act,6l which pro-
vides for mediation and a 60 day "cooling off" period, after which the
disputants could strike. Mr. Taft's bill was a reiteration of his late father's
belief that free collective bargaining and the lawful exercise of the right
were reported, and the public suffered relatively little inconvenience, dire conse-
quences might have arisen had an electrical storm or some similar emergency created
a quick need for the restoration of electrical service.
'H.B. 794, 102nd Ohio General Assembly, Regular Session, 1957
r'Hearings on H.B. 794, which would have amended OHIO REV. CODE § 5503.02
and enacted OHio REV. CODE § 107.21, were started before the House Judiciary
Committee on April 13, 1957. Labor representatives bitterly opposed the bill, claim-
ing that it would have given the Governor of Ohio dictatorial powers, since he alone
would decide when an emergency existed. They asserted that the State Highway
Patrol would become his personal police force, which could have been used as a
strikebreaking instrument.
H.B. 794 failed to pass. It was sent to the House Judiciary Committee on April
4, 1957, but never left committee.
'House Bill 749 would have amended OHIo REV. CODE §§ 4975.01-4975.09 and
enacted OHio REv. CODE § 4975.99. At the time of writing, the bill had not been
printed and no copies were available. In a personal correspondence, Mr. Taft wrote
that his bill "in effect, applies the national emergency provisions of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act to local public utility disputes."
H.B. 749 was not enacted. It was sent to the House Industry and Labor Commit-
tee on April 17, 1957, but never left committee.
"Labor-Management Relations Act. 61 STAT. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 176
(Supp. 1956).
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to strike should not be impeded by compulsory arbitration, seizure or
other emergency measures. 2
The effectiveness of the 60 day "cooling off" period has been seriously
questioned. Some union leaders have contended that it actually impedes
free collective bargaining, since it might induce the employer to rely on
statutory rules forbidding a strike. They contend that the "cooling off'
period, since it forces employees to work under terms and conditions that
they have not agreed to, does not really "cool off" any one, but rather
adds fuel to an existing controversy which may be already highly flam-
mable.
It is submitted that the all-important question of what the state is to
do when a strike finally occurs is still left unanswered. Mr. Taft's "cool-
ing off" period might delay the strike, but if such provision only serves to
fan the tempers of the disputing parties, despite federal and state media-
tion, and a strike resulting in an emergency does occur, the State of Ohio
would still be unable to meet the peril. It would again be forced to waive
the white surrender flag of pre-emption, as it remained mired in the no-
man's land of local emergencies not covered by the national emergency
provision of the Federal Act.
CONCLUSION
The Portsmouth Strike graphically indicated the inadequacy of Ohio's
public utility labor law. At the emergency session, the legislators dropped
the "hot potato." House Bill 749, introduced by Robert Taft, Jr., at-
tempted to pick it up. The bill, with its junior Taft-Hartley emergency
provisions, would undoubtedly be upheld by the courts. It recognized and
protected the freedom of collective bargaining and the right to strike (once
the 60 day "cooling off" period had expired) Rather than governmental
intervention and compulsion, the weight of public opinion would bring
pressure upon the parties to resolve their differences. Voluntary arbitra-
tion would be encouraged. However, the free collective bargaining proc-
ess is sorely tested when a public emergency results from an impasse in
a utility dispute. It is of small consolation to the people whose very lives
are jeopardized by the lack of utility service to assure them that such
dangers are the cost of a free society.
It is believed that House Bill 749 did not go far enough in coping
with the problem. It did not say what the State of Ohio was to do when
the "cooling off" period expired and a crippling utility strike rendered an
Ohio community helpless. Keeping in mind that the federal law does
not mince words in absolutely protecting the lawful exercise of the right
to strike, it is contended that Ohio, because its utilities are affected with
" See note 40, supra.
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